

CJTF-82-CS

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation IAW AR 15-6 Concerning the Events Surrounding the Deaths of CPT Joshua Lawrence and CPT Drew Russell and Other Soldiers Seriously Injured on 8 October 2011 at the ANA Old Corps Headquarters, Kandahar City

(h) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ RPG Launcher, (b)(1)1.4a, secured by SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) at Old Corps HQs the night of 8 October 2011 [See Exhibit VV], and subsequently submitted into evidence by SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) [See Exhibit BBB], resulted in a JEFF Lab finding of one functional Russian RPG-7V launcher. [See Exhibit HHH]

3. FINDINGS.

a. ~~(S//REL TO US, ISAF, NATO)~~ The TF Bison chain of command and ANSF partners picked a suitable location for the TAC. The inner compound possessed sufficient space and facilities for that size operation; additionally the site could have been easily secured. The following points, however, show that US and ANA chains of command failed to use appropriate security and force protection measures to secure the compound and safeguard their Soldiers. ANA and US chains of command's familiarity with the location and each other, failure to address suspicious activity, and failure to implement and enforce minimum security standards led to the inner compound being unsecured.

(1) ~~(S//REL TO US, ISAF, NATO)~~ Old Corps is a military base that US and Coalition Forces had used in the past. Leadership responsible for the conference security plan assessed no credible threats to the compound as the Old Corps had not experienced any enemy activity in more than a year. [Exhibit A]

(2) ~~(S//REL TO US, ISAF, NATO)~~ MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) was confident the TAC was secure since the US and ANA Soldiers were providing local security. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) trusted the LNOs to control ANSF access into the TAC. CTFW and TF Bison had worked with the ANA, AUP, ANCOP and ABP LNOs during previous events. [Exhibit T]

(3) ~~(S//REL TO US, ISAF, NATO)~~ While the ANA put the inner TAC compound off-limits to ANSF personnel, there was a steady flow of ANSF personnel into and out of the TAC compound throughout the day with no security checks or means of determining who the personnel were. [Exhibits A, N,S,U]

(4) ~~(S//REL TO US, ISAF, NATO)~~ The security plan in place leading up to the attack was not sufficient, finalized, or briefed to security personnel. Around 1700-1800, the chain of command discussed a security plan for the TAC when SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) asked SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) about setting up a guard roster and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) spoke to CPT Russell